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Involuntary disputes: 
When competition for 
members forces smaller 
unions to strike
Agnes Akkerman
VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Radboud University Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands
Abstract
Industrial relations theory has produced two conflicting hypotheses on the effects 
of multi-unionism on the incidence of industrial conflict. International comparative 
research proposes that unions organizing the same worker domains are prone to 
competition, for which industrial conflict is used as a means of propaganda. British 
economic research claims that unions organizing substitutable workers cooperate 
and act as one union. This study argues that apparent cooperation is not always 
voluntary action but is sometimes the result of a loss of autonomy caused by 
competition and a lack of mobilization power. Micro-level data on industrial action 
are used to test hypotheses of the conditions for such involuntary participation in 
labor disputes.
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Introduction
This study addresses a problem of labor unions competing for members in a 
situation of multi-unionism. “Multi-unionism” refers to situations in which 
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more than one union represents employees in the collective bargaining pro-
cess. Unlike in the United States, exclusive jurisdiction is exceptional in 
Europe (Visser, 1992), and unions commonly negotiate with employers 
simultaneously with other unions on the level of the sector as well as at the 
company level (Akkerman, 2008). The majority of the European Union 
member states have multiple labor union confederations, organizing mem-
bers along political, religious, or occupational (status) lines (Eurofound, 
2014). Even in the United Kingdom, Austria, Ireland, and Latvia— 
countries with just one union confederation—unaffiliated unions and union 
representation by several unions within the same confederation exist. Thus, 
multi-union bargaining is a common if not dominant feature of Western 
European industrial relations. Sometimes, these unions coordinate their bar-
gaining activities, for instance, by setting joint wage demands and synchro-
nizing the communication to their rank and file. Joining forces increases 
their bargaining power.
In this study, I focus on the interdependency of unions in collective bar-
gaining, more specifically in calling a strike. Union interdependency exists 
for two reasons. First, a union may be dependent on the other union’s mobi-
lization power. For a successful strike, it is of vital importance to mobilize 
as many as workers as possible. While the mobilization of own members 
may already be difficult for a union in a single-union context, the mobiliza-
tion of strikers is even more problematic if workers are divided among two 
or more unions. Therefore, some unions may depend on collaboration with 
other unions to ensure sufficient numbers of strikers to make credible threats 
or call successful strikes.
However, under some conditions, one’s colleagues may also be competi-
tors, vying with one another for workers to organize. Such competition for 
members is particularly present during looming industrial actions and con-
stitutes the second reason for union interdependency: industrial action 
undertaken by one union may affect another union’s membership when 
members defect to the union that organizes industrial action. Therefore, act-
ing independent of one’s competitor may be risky.
The interdependencies created by insufficient mobilization power and 
competition for members affect unions’ autonomy in calling strikes and their 
decisions to call them alone or with other unions. I argue that under certain 
conditions, these interdependencies lead unions to involuntarily join the 
strikes of other unions. Using multinomial regression analysis and a data set 
of 89 Dutch unions’ decisions to engage in industrial conflict nested in 28 
collective bargaining negotiations, I test four hypotheses regarding the effect 
of mobilization interdependency and competition on the probability that 
unions will imitate their competitors. I find that competition between unions 
increases the probability of a joint strike when size differences—indicating 
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mobilization interdependency—increase. The results of this study contribute 
to our understanding of inter-union relations and their effects on industrial 
relations outcomes.
The problem of multi-unionism
Multi-unionism is associated with high economic costs. It elevates wages 
by leap-frogging wage claims, increases unemployment, and reduces pro-
ductivity growth (Oswald, 1979; Pohjola, 1984). Above all, scholars of 
industrial relations have argued that union rivalry increases the frequency of 
industrial disputes. Two different mechanisms are held responsible for this: 
(a) unions’ propagandistic use of strikes in their competition for members 
and (b) the diverging interests of unions, which create more and potentially 
contradictory bargaining claims that the employer may not be able to fulfill. 
The first mechanism is hypothesized by a large body of literature in the 
field of industrial relations and refers to the use of industrial conflict as a 
means of propaganda in the competition for members by unions sharing a 
domain of comparable workers (Akkerman, 2008; Battista, 1991; Galenson, 
1940; Gitlow, 1952; Krislov, 1960; Lester, 1958; Stout, 1998; Webb and 
Webb, 1897). Although the mechanism is often suggested as a cause for 
industrial disputes, the empirical confirmation of the effect remains equivo-
cal to date. Some countries with multi-unionism face relatively high levels 
of industrial disputes, whereas others have relatively low levels of industrial 
conflict. The second mechanism refers to the bidding up of bargaining 
claims of unions representing the distinct workers of one employer. This 
mechanism is supported by sector-level studies for the United Kingdom 
(Dobson, 1997; Gall, 1994; Ingram et al., 1993; Machin et al., 1993) and 
several continental European countries (Akkerman, 2008).
Horn and Wolinsky (1988) relate the effects of multi-unionism to bar-
gaining structure. Their claim is not that multi-unionism per se raises wages 
and increases the incidence of disputes, but rather whether unions engage in 
joint bargaining or separate bargaining. The choice between these options 
comes down to the substitutability of workers. When workers have more in 
common, such as skills, they are more easily substituted during strikes. This 
weakens unions’ bargaining position because their members can be quickly 
replaced during a strike by members of other unions not on strike or by 
employees who are not union members. It would therefore be rational for 
unions that represent similar workers to join forces and act as one during 
collective bargaining. Thus, according to Horn and Wolinsky (1988), unions 
sharing the same domain of workers should cooperate and engage in joint 
bargaining instead of separate bargaining. Research on multi-unionism in 
Britain supports the hypothesis that joint bargaining equals single-union 
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bargaining in its effects, both on wages and labor disputes (Bryson, 2005; 
Machin et al., 1993), and concludes that unions that bargain simultaneously 
in one bargaining unit act as a single actor. This finding suggests that com-
petition for members does not affect bargaining outcomes, either because 
competition does not exist or because rival unions can set their competitive-
ness aside during bargaining.
However, there are at least three reasons to question this conclusion. 
First, the absence of higher strike activity does not necessarily mean that 
union competition does not affect bargaining outcome or the level of indus-
trial disputes. The only thing that can be concluded is that competition is not 
necessarily expressed by higher strike activity. Second, there is more con-
flict expression in industrial relations than strikes alone. Particularly in 
multi-union bargaining settings where a union’s individual bargaining 
power is relatively small, we should pay attention to other expressions of 
conflict, such as rallies, picket lines, work-to-rule, and so forth. Each of 
these forms of industrial conflict is widely used in practice but they are 
wrongly ignored in the field of industrial relations. Third and foremost, the 
conclusion that unions in joint bargaining act as one unified actor may be a 
faulty interpretation of observed similarities in strategies. Joint strategies 
toward the employer (of either industrial action or conciliation) may be the 
result of cooperation and solidarity (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988; Jun, 1989; 
Walsh, 1994). However, joint strategies may also be the result of involun-
tary imitation of one’s competitors due to a loss of autonomy caused by 
interdependency of choices for the unions involved. These interdependen-
cies derive from two conditions: (a) potential dependency on a rival’s mobi-
lization power: depending on their own share of members, unions may 
depend on their colleagues’ membership for industrial action to be success-
ful (I label this mobilization dependence), and (b) dependency created by 
the potential and anticipated impact of strikes on membership numbers. 
Industrial action on the part of one union may affect the other union’s mem-
bership, such as when members defect to the union that calls for industrial 
action. Walsh (1994) labels this situation competitive interdependence.
Condition 1: Splits in bargaining power
A union’s membership is considered the most important determinant of its 
bargaining power (Britt and Galle, 1972; Martin, 1992). The higher the 
number of employees who are members of the union, the more workers a 
union can call for a strike. Although the actual “quota” of strikers who are 
necessary for a strike to be successful varies with the bargaining context, it 
is safe to assume that the chances of success increase with the number of 
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strikers. Generally speaking, the more workers who participate in a strike, 
the more the production process is disrupted, posing higher costs to the 
employer. A union’s capability to call a serious strike is therefore considered 
its most important asset during bargaining. Under single-union bargaining 
that is common in the United States, the union’s bargaining power depends 
on the share of employees who are members of the union. If this single 
union calls a strike, it calls on all of the employees who are union members 
to strike. There is no other union whose members break the strike, that is, 
substitute the strikers or take over their work during and after the strike.
Under multi-union bargaining, however, members are divided over two 
or more unions (Akkerman et al., 1995; Horn and Wolinsky, 1988; Walsh, 
1994). Keeping total membership constant, calling a solitary strike consti-
tutes a higher risk of not meeting the quota of members for winning a strike 
for unions under multi-unionism. Because of their fragmented bargaining 
power, strikes of unions under multi-unionism are subject to potential 
strike-breaking by other unions. Thus, multi-unionism reduces the expected 
utility of industrial action for unions unless the unions act in concert and call 
a joint strike. The sharing of (potential) membership thus creates mobiliza-
tion dependence between unions. Assuming that cooperation involves trans-
action costs, this reasoning leads to the prediction that multi-unionism 
reduces rather than increases the incidence of industrial action (Horn and 
Wolinsky, 1988), thus contradicting the current hypotheses on multi- 
unionism. However, for now, the most important conclusion is that multi-
unionism creates mobilization dependence between unions.
Condition 2: Overlapping membership characteristics
The second condition that creates interdependence is overlapping member-
ship. When two trade unions (aim to) represent distinct workers, their sub-
stitutability is small, and the danger of members defecting from one union 
to the other is small. Union divisions along distinct religious, political, or 
occupational lines mean there is less scope for members to change unions 
than when unions represent similar groups of employees. However, for 
many unions, membership is not absolutely distinct but overlaps in certain 
or all characteristics (cf. Horn and Wolinsky’s substitutability). It is my con-
tention that the larger the overlap in membership characteristics (from now 
labeled overlap) of unions, the larger the probability of members defecting 
from one union to the other. Overlap between union memberships does not 
necessarily lead members to switch sides, but if an occasion arises, mem-
bers may defect. Industrial action by one of the unions is just such an occa-
sion (Walsh, 1994).
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 7, 2014rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Akkerman 451
Gaining and losing members due to a strike. An important assumption 
underlying the idea that unions use strikes or strike threats as a means of 
propaganda is that workers are willing to join a union or even change 
unions during a (looming) strike. Members switching from one union to 
another is so common that a term for such switching exists: “spoils of 
war” (see, for instance, Akkerman, 2000). An explanation of the rationale 
for workers to join or switch to a union on strike requires a temporary shift 
from the union perspective to the perspective of employees. Mobilization 
research generally agrees that the presence of a complaint or a feeling of 
injustice is a precondition for people to join protest and social movements, 
such as trade unions (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995; Klandermans, 
1984). When an individual considers the gains of union membership to 
outweigh the cost of membership, it is likely that an individual will join a 
union. Membership fees are direct costs of joining a union, whereas rep-
resentation in collective bargaining, legal advice and protection, and a 
strike benefit during strikes are benefits of union membership. In addition, 
social costs and benefits, such as disapproval or support by others, such as 
family, colleagues, and supervisors, are part of this cost–benefit calcula-
tion (Klandermans, 1984). A looming strike may urge a worker to rebal-
ance the social costs and benefits, such as social support of colleagues 
(who approve of membership) or the social disapproval of, for instance, 
the supervisor (who disapproves of union membership). It is plausible that 
a strike or even a looming conflict with an employer is an occasion during 
which such costs and benefits proliferate. First, during a (looming) strike, 
workers’ discontent with their working conditions or the way the employer 
treats them is higher or at least more visible than under normal circum-
stances. This can be the case when the conflict is the direct result of prob-
lems between the workers and the employer or when the employer declines 
the demands of the union during regular contract negations. Workers who 
want to protest unsatisfactory conditions by way of a strike will lose 
income, which makes them dependent on the strike fund of a union. 
Because unions usually restrict their strike benefits to union members, 
workers have a strong financial incentive to join a union during (or just 
before) a strike. Moreover, strikes are situations in which solidarity among 
workers is important to making a strike successful. Social pressure via 
norms to participate in the strike exercised by co-workers is a well-known 
phenomenon (Coleman, 1994; Francis, 1985; Getman, 1999; Thommes 
and Akkerman, 2013; Thommes et al., 2014). Once convinced or pres-
sured by their colleagues to participate in a strike, workers are morally or 
financially forced to join the union that calls the strike. Thus, during a 
(looming) strike, unorganized workers are more likely to become union 
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members than under normal circumstances. Moreover, those workers 
already organized may reconsider their membership if their union does 
not call a strike, and switch to a union that does support the strike. If 
unions overlap, members may defect to a union calling a strike (assump-
tion 1).
Although there is a strong incentive to join a union that calls a strike (and 
pays strike benefits), employees will only benefit from the strike in which 
they participate when it is successful. That is, when it leads to improved 
employment conditions. Having participated in an unsuccessful strike is 
likely to be conceived as a senseless and costly adventure for which the 
initiator, that is, the union, will be held responsible. Particularly when the 
lost strike is called by a single union, other less risk-taking unions may 
become attractive alternatives. Thus, while strikes serve as opportunities to 
recruit union members, calling an unsuccessful strike may cost union mem-
bers. If union membership overlaps, an unsuccessful strike may cause mem-
bers to defect from the striking union to the union that is not on strike 
(assumption 2).
From the union’s perspective, which depends on its membership for its 
organizational survival, it is important to anticipate the consequences of 
calling a strike in terms of membership gains and losses. A union’s decision 
to refrain from joining the strike of a competitor may cause severe member-
ship losses. Calling an unsuccessful solidarity strike is also associated with 
a risk of losing union members.
The next section will discuss how overlaps in union membership affect a 
union’s decisions to call for industrial action, why such decisions also 
depend on the decisions of their competitors, and how mobilization depend-
ence interacts with competitive dependence.
Joint or solitary strategies
A union that bargains in a multi-union bargaining situation in which a dis-
pute with the employer arises has two options: (a) cooperate with the other 
union(s), as Horn and Wolinsky (1988) suggest they will or (b) follow a 
solitary strategy. When unions cooperate, the chances of winning a dispute 
change, most often to their advantage. When trade unions in multi-union 
bargaining cooperate, they are, ceteris paribus, as powerful as a single trade 
union that bargains with the employer exclusively. Their cooperation com-
pensates for their weakened position caused by their restricted mobilization 
power. Cooperation increases the chances of successfully calling for indus-
trial action and forcing the employer to fulfill unions’ demands. If the 
chances of success were the only consideration for a joint strategy, an 
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alliance would be the only rational course of action, precisely as suggested 
by Horn and Wolinsky (1988).
However, unions may represent different interests, resulting in diverg-
ing bargaining claims. Particularly when unions organize (partly) distinct 
groups of employees, they are more likely to differ in their appreciation of 
the employer’s final offer. Unions may therefore differ in substantive 
incentives for industrial action. Thus, cooperation between unions, 
let alone behaving as unified actors, is not a universal strategy. As in polit-
ical party coalition formation, union coalitions involve coordination costs 
(Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 1973), which increase as the participants’ sub-
stantive differences regarding bargaining grow. Once an alliance is estab-
lished, the problem of coordination continues during industrial action 
because the coalition may easily fracture. A union with few or moderate 
claims will be more easily satisfied by a peace offering from the employer 
than will its ally with more or higher claims (Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 
1973), and may therefore leave its ally during industrial action. Such a 
fractured coalition endangers the success of the union that continues its 
battle with the employer. Thus, the chance for a joint strategy between two 
unions decreases as the difference in substantive incentives increases: the 
larger the differences in substantive incentives between potential allies, 
the larger the costs of such an alliance, in particular, of a strike alliance. 
Although joint strike strategies can reflect similarities in interests and 
result from deliberate and voluntary cooperation, I demonstrate that joint 
strategies can also be the result of “forced cooperation” due to (a) mem-
bership competition and (b) asymmetric mobilization dependency.
I assume that a greater overlap between two unions will increase the 
potential for membership changes between these unions because workers 
can easily switch between overlapping unions. Thus, the risk of member-
ship loss associated with deviating from a rival union’s strategy is larger 
when the overlap with its rival is greater. A joint strategy with a competitor 
(either a joint strike or a joint peaceful strategy) is the only certain strategy 
for preventing membership loss to this particular competitor. In fact, the 
above follows from assumptions 1 and 2 and can be summarized in a third 
assumption: Deviating from a rival union increases the risk of losing mem-
bers (assumption 3).
The incentive to not deviate from a rival union’s decision to call a strike 
can mean that a union engages in industrial action even though it would not 
have on the basis of its substantive incentives. In fact, I assume that a union 
wants to prevent membership loss at any time and prioritizes its own sur-
vival above the interest of its members.1 Keeping members is more impor-
tant than improving labor conditions (assumption 4).
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Of course, competition due to overlap can discourage a union from 
industrial action regardless of its dissatisfaction with the bargaining results. 
This may be the result when, for example, a union fears an unintended solo 
battle with the employer and expects to lose members to its competitor due 
to unsuccessful industrial action.
Which of the competing unions will be able to make the first move, that 
is, decide whether to engage in industrial action? Who imitates whom? 
According to Cohn (1993), the size of a union, based on the number of 
members, is relevant to the question of which union can afford the first 
move. The dominant union, that is, the union that organizes the most work-
ers, will enjoy several important advantages when negotiating with the 
employer. First, the employer may reach an agreement with just one of the 
unions. Although this does not necessarily have to be the dominant union, it 
is generally more likely that the employer will strike a bargain that yields as 
many employees as possible. Moreover, an agreement without the dominant 
union will produce more potential opposition to the agreement. Obviously, 
the relevance of this first advantage will depend on the juridical arrange-
ments under which the bargaining takes places and may differ between 
countries. However, the second and third advantages are strategic and 
depend less on local bargaining regimes. Asymmetric interdependence 
works to the advantage of the dominant union. It is less dependent on its 
smaller rival for mobilizing the quota of employees for industrial action 
than the smaller rival is dependent on the larger union (Cohn, 1993: 13). 
This makes it easier for the dominant union to take the initiative. A union 
dominating in size has a first mover advantage (assumption 5).
Finally, related to the former advantage, the potential costs of a broken 
alliance are smaller for a dominant union than for a small union. The domi-
nant union is more likely to continue industrial action when the smaller 
union withdraws and to still be successful than vice versa. Larger unions 
have a higher probability of winning a solitary strike (assumption 6).
For a small union, continuing its protest alone will most likely not make 
sense because the small proportion of employees it represents may be easily 
replaced by members of the dominant union. Smaller unions are less likely 
to win a solitary strike (assumption 7).
Summing up, the assumptions made (in the order they appeared in the 
text) are the following:
1. If unions overlap, members may defect to a union calling a strike.
2. If union membership overlaps, an unsuccessful strike may cause 
members to defect from the striking union to the union that is not on 
strike;
 (thus)
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3. Deviating from a rival union increases the risk of losing members.
4. Keeping members is more important than improving labor 
conditions.
5. A union dominating in size has a first mover advantage
 (because)
6. Larger unions have a higher probability of winning a solitary strike.
7. Smaller unions are less likely to win a solitary strike.
With the aid of payoff matrices depicting two unions’ payoffs for out-
comes of the interdependent choice to strike, I will show that when these 
assumptions hold, we can expect forced joint strategies between unions. 
Figure 1 depicts the outcomes of the four possible outcomes, resulting from 
both unions’ decisions to call a strike or not.
Figure 2 depicts situation A in which the larger union has a high incentive 
to change labor conditions through a strike, whereas the smaller union does 
not. Figure 3 presents situation B in which the larger union has no incentive 
to change labor conditions through a strike, whereas the smaller union does.
Situation A. The large union wants to change labor conditions.
Figure 2 shows that, for the large union, going on strike is the dominant 
strategy because it has a first mover advantage (assumption 6). The rational 
Small Union
 Strike No strike
Large Union Strike LCΔ; LCΔ; M LU +; M SU-
 No strike M LU +; M SU- SQ
Figure 1. Outcomes of interdependent choice to strike under asymmetric 
mobilization interdependency and competition.
LCΔ: change in labor conditions; M LU: membership gain for large union, M SU-: 
membership loss for smaller union: SQ: status quo (with respect to both labor conditions 
and membership).
Small Union
 Strike No strike
Large Union Strike 3,3 4,1
 No strike 2,2 1,4
Figure 2. Payoffs for unions facing asymmetric mobilization interdependency and 
competition in a situation in which Large Union wants to change labor conditions.
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response for the smaller union is also going on strike because doing so will 
prevent membership loss. Refraining from striking would mean losing 
members to the larger union and not prevent unwanted changes in labor 
conditions.
Situation B. The larger union has no incentive to change labor conditions 
through a strike, whereas small union does have an incentive.
Figure 3 shows that when there is no incentive for the large union to go 
on strike, the dominant strategy for the large union is not to go on strike 
(assumption 6). The rational response for small union is also not going on 
strike because this will prevent membership loss. Going on strike would 
mean losing the strike (assumption 7) and, as a result, losing members to 
large union (assumption 2) while still not attaining changes in labor 
conditions.
Hypotheses
Based on the above assumptions, I expect that the probability of forced 
cooperation increases with the level of overlap between unions: the greater 
the overlap a union has with the other union, the higher the probability of a 
joint strategy with that union (Hypothesis 1).
Moreover, I expect such forced cooperation to be more likely when 
unions differ more in size because this decreases the changes for the smaller 
union to opt for the autonomous strategy, meaning that the probability of a 
joint strategy with the other union increases with size differences between 
the unions (Hypothesis 2). In addition, I expect an interaction effect between 
the size of the dominant union and the overlap with this union because the 
incentive to imitate the dominant union will be stronger when the overlap 
with this dominant union is larger because potential membership loss due to 
a solitary strategy—carrying larger risks of being unsuccessful—will 
increase when overlap is greater. I therefore expect that the larger a union’s 
Small Union
 Strike No strike
Large Union Strike 1,4 2,3
No strike 4,1 3,2
Figure 3. Payoffs for unions facing asymmetric mobilization interdependency and 
competition in a situation in which the large union does not want to change labor 
conditions.
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competitor is in size, the larger the effect of overlap will be on the probabil-
ity of a joint strategy with this competitor (Hypothesis 3).
Obviously, a joint strategy by unions can also result from cooperation for 
substantive reasons, that is, when they have similar incentives to go on 
strike (or to refrain from striking). I will therefore control my analyses for 
an alternative hypothesis, stating that
The greater the similarities in substantive reasons for a strike that a 
union has with its competitor, the higher the probability of a joint strat-
egy with that competitor (Hypothesis 4).
Data and methodology
The hypotheses in this study involve micro-level decision making and must 
therefore be tested on the level at which union decision making takes place 
(Gramm, 1986; Tracy, 1987; Wheeler, 1984). Data sets on micro-level 
motives and behavior of unions large enough to apply advanced statistics are 
not readily available. Moreover, the hypotheses predict both peaceful and 
conflict strategies. Therefore, a comparative case study sampling method 
was most appropriate. I pooled two data sets of collective bargaining nego-
tiations. The first set of collective bargaining negotiations was randomly 
selected from the list of regular collective bargaining agreements, as recorded 
by the Dutch Department of Social Affairs and Employment, which includes 
all of the collective bargaining agreements in The Netherlands. To ensure a 
reasonable number of disputes, a second data set was created following a 
different sampling method. For this second sample, the population of collec-
tive bargaining negotiations with industrial disputes was determined by 
extensive media screening in the period between May 1995 and May 1997. 
During this 2-year period, 36 labor disputes during collective bargaining 
were reported by the national media, of which the 14 latest were selected to 
reduce the recall biases. After the sampling of the negotiations, the partici-
pating unions and their choices of whether to call for industrial action were 
identified. The final sample consists of 88 unions: 36 unions that engaged in 
any form of industrial action during the specified period and 52 unions that 
had not engaged in such action. The total sample included 28 collective bar-
gaining negotiations, 16 of which witnessed conflict. In both sets, the collec-
tive agreements expired between October 1996 and December 1997. I did 
not select on bargaining level. Data for these collective bargaining negotia-
tions were gathered by interviewing negotiators from two different unions 
and extensive document analyses, such as formal correspondence between 
employers and unions, and the minutes of meetings. A more detailed account 
of specific data gathering is given in the sections “Dependent variables” and 
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“Independent variables.” Table 1 shows the selected collective agreement 
negotiated, the number of unions involved in the negotiations, and the con-
flict and bargaining levels.
Data structure
The hypotheses concern the probability of union i engaging in a joint strat-
egy with union j. The probability of joint (action) strategy is measured on 
the level of unique union pairs. This variable was created by determining for 
each union in the collective bargaining whether it employed a similar strat-
egy to that of each other union in the collective bargaining. This resulted in 
a dichotomized variable in which union i applied the same strategy as union 
j (1) or not (0).
For example, in the negotiations for the metal workers’ three unions, 
union a, union b, and union c, participated, of which two called for indus-
trial action, thus employing a similar strategy, and one did not call for indus-
trial action, thus employing a solitary strategy. To test whether their choices 
to engage in conflict or not are affected by the characteristics of the other 
unions in the collective bargaining, the data were structured according to 
unique pairs of unions within the collective bargaining. In the example of 
the metal workers, each of the three unions is present in two pairs. For union 
a, union a–union b; union a–union c. For union b, union b–union a; union 
b–union c. For union c, union c—union a; union c–union b. Thus, the data 
set contains 214 cases, representing individual unions paired with every 
other union in the negotiation.
Dependent variables
I test the hypotheses with a multinomial dependent variable in which I dis-
tinguish between (a) joint industrial action and (b) a joint peaceful alliance 
opposed to a solitary strategy (0).
To construct this dependent variable, each union’s involvement in indus-
trial action was determined. A union’s involvement in industrial action is a 
dichotomized measure, indicating whether a union was involved in industrial 
action (1) or not (0). Industrial action in this study is not restricted to strikes 
but is defined as a broad range of possible action intended to force the 
employer to give in to unions’ demands.2 The data on the involvement of 
unions in industrial conflict were obtained from documents (e.g. the official 
and legally mandatory letters of strike announcement to the employer in 
which unions announce industrial action) and media reports. This information 
was verified with interviews with union representatives. After having deter-
mined each union’s involvement in industrial action, I constructed the 
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 7, 2014rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Akkerman 459
T
ab
le
 1
. 
Se
le
ct
ed
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ag
re
em
en
t 
ne
go
tia
tio
ns
.
C
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ag
re
em
en
t 
ne
go
tia
tio
ns
 w
ith
 in
du
st
ri
al
 a
ct
io
n 
C
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ag
re
em
en
t 
ne
go
tia
tio
ns
 w
ith
ou
t 
in
du
st
ri
al
 a
ct
io
n
C
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ag
re
em
en
t 
fo
r
N
um
be
r 
of
 
un
io
ns
 (
in
 a
ct
io
n)
T
yp
e 
of
 in
du
st
ri
al
 a
ct
io
n
C
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ag
re
em
en
t 
fo
r
N
um
be
r 
of
 u
ni
on
s
A
 fo
od
 c
om
pa
ny
 (
C
)
4(
3)
W
ild
ca
t 
st
ri
ke
 la
te
r 
ac
kn
ow
le
dg
ed
 b
y 
un
io
ns
A
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 c
om
pa
ny
 
(C
)
2
H
ea
lth
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
(S
)
3(
1)
St
ri
ke
 t
hr
ea
t
A
 r
ai
lw
ay
 in
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 
co
m
pa
ny
 (
C
)
2
Br
oa
dc
as
tin
g 
(S
)
4(
4)
St
ri
ke
 t
hr
ea
t
Fo
to
-fi
ni
sh
in
g 
in
du
st
ry
 (
S)
2
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
(S
)
4(
2)
R
ef
us
al
 t
o 
si
gn
 c
on
tr
ac
t
A
ir
lin
e 
gr
ou
nd
 c
re
w
 (
C
)
4
Pu
bl
ic
 li
br
ar
ie
s 
(S
)
2(
2)
W
or
k 
st
op
pa
ge
s
A
 t
el
ec
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 
co
m
pa
ny
 (
C
)
3
El
ec
tr
on
ic
s 
co
m
pa
ny
 (
C
)
4(
2)
St
ri
ke
 t
hr
ea
t, 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
ns
, 
re
fu
sa
l t
o 
si
gn
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t
N
at
io
na
l h
ou
si
ng
 a
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
(S
)
3
A
 fo
od
 c
om
pa
ny
 (
C
)
4(
3)
St
ri
ke
 t
hr
ea
t
U
til
iti
es
 (
w
at
er
, e
ne
rg
y,
 e
tc
.) 
(S
)
4
Po
lic
e 
(S
)
4(
4)
St
ri
ke
O
il 
st
or
ag
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 (
C
)
3
H
os
pi
ta
ls
 (
S)
4(
1)
D
em
on
st
ra
tio
ns
, r
ef
us
al
 t
o 
si
gn
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t
D
en
ta
l t
ec
hn
ic
ia
ns
 (
C
)
3
Pr
ob
at
io
n 
of
fic
er
s 
(S
)
2(
2)
W
or
k 
st
op
pa
ge
 
M
et
al
-p
ro
du
ci
ng
 in
du
st
ry
 (
S)
4(
2)
St
ri
ke
 t
hr
ea
t
T
em
po
ra
ry
 a
ge
nc
y 
st
af
f (
C
)
3
Su
pe
rm
ar
ke
ts
 (
S)
2(
2)
St
ri
ke
s
H
au
la
ge
 in
du
st
ry
 (
S)
2
H
or
tic
ul
tu
re
 (
S)
2(
2)
A
bo
lis
h 
bi
-p
ar
tit
e 
co
ns
ul
ta
tiv
e 
bo
dy
A
 lo
gi
st
ic
s 
co
m
pa
ny
 (
C
)
3
M
et
al
w
or
ke
rs
 (
S)
3(
2)
St
ri
ke
 t
hr
ea
t
 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t 
st
or
e 
ch
ai
n 
(C
)
4(
2)
St
ri
ke
 t
hr
ea
t
 
R
ai
lw
ay
s 
(C
)
4(
3)
St
ri
ke
 t
hr
ea
t
 
C
: c
om
pa
ny
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ba
rg
ai
ni
ng
; S
: s
ec
to
r-
le
ve
l b
ar
ga
in
in
g.
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on October 7, 2014rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
460 Rationality and Society 26(4)
ultimate dependent, multinomial variable by comparing the strategy of union 
i with that of union j: if both were involved in industrial action, this was val-
ued (1). If neither was involved in industrial action, this was valued (2), and 
the cases in which union i was involved while union j was not, and vice versa, 
were valued (0).
Independent variables
Data on the independent variables were obtained by interviewing union nego-
tiators who took part in particular collective bargaining processes. For each of 
the collective bargaining processes, negotiators from two unions were inter-
viewed. If more than two unions had participated in the negotiation, the 
respondents were selected randomly unless the unions had been in conflict 
with each other publicly. In such cases, the representatives of the two conflict-
ing unions were interviewed. By interviewing negotiators from two different 
unions, it was possible to gather data from different perspectives and to verify 
any contradictory information resulting from potential post hoc reasoning and 
recall bias. The first of the 57 interviews was conducted in August 1996, the 
last in March 1998, applying an order in which earlier negotiations were inter-
viewed for first. The interviews were conducted at the union office, lasted at 
least 60 minutes and were all conducted by me. Some documents, such as 
correspondence and minutes, were obtained before the interviews, while 
other material, such as occasional bargaining logs and diary fragments, were 
obtained during or after the interviews. Thus, recall problems and post hoc 
interpretations were minimized. It is important to note that in the Dutch bar-
gaining context, formal correspondence is a source of important information. 
Before starting the negotiations, each union sends formal correspondence in 
which it states its bargaining claims. I made extensive use of these documents 
to reconstruct the bargaining issues of each party.
The interviews were highly structured and completely standardized, con-
taining mainly questions that requested quantified information about the 
bargaining issues with the employer and characteristics of the unions and 
their membership. If permitted, the interviews were audio recorded. The 
response after an introductory letter explaining the purpose of the interview 
and a phone call was high: only one negotiator refused cooperation, result-
ing in the selection of another collective bargaining negotiation.
Substantive difference
To measure the effect of competition on industrial action, the effect of com-
petition must be distinguished from substantive reasons for a strike. The 
isolation of substantive reasons for a strike from competition for members 
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requires objective evaluation of the extent to which bargaining parties are 
unable to reach an agreement that results in an impasse. While simply ask-
ing negotiators to identify and quantify the degree of substantive reasons for 
calling a strike would most likely not provide an objective and unbiased 
measure, I made use of a computer-aided simulation model developed by 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994) 
that simulates negotiations on the basis of the actual bargaining issues, the 
salience parties attached to these respective issues and power relations. This 
expected utility-based model has found a wide range of applications in deci-
sion-making analyses, including collective bargaining (Rojer, 1999).
The input data for this simulation were obtained through a careful recon-
struction of all of the collective bargaining issues, each party’s preferred 
outcome on these issues, the salience each party attached to each of these 
issues, and the parties’ respective bargaining power. This reconstruction 
was performed with help of the interviewed negotiators. To isolate the 
“pure” substantive incentives for each party for an eventual action, the bar-
gaining was simulated on the basis of these variables. By means of this 
computer-aided simulation, the number of unresolved issues for each bar-
gaining party was obtained. This number was normalized for the total num-
ber of issues with which a bargaining party was involved. The idea of this 
indicator is that the lower the number of unresolved issues a union has, the 
less incentive it has to call for industrial action (e.g. a strike). This simula-
tion and the data gathered for it are summarized in Appendix 1. For a more 
technical explanation, consult Achterkamp and Akkerman (2003). For the 
present data set, this predictor of substantive conflict for the individual 
union is positively associated with the probability of a union to call a strike, 
with a z value = 2.02 (p < 0.05) in a hierarchical model (unions nested in 
collective agreement negotiations), controlled for union membership rate.
The variable of differences in substantive incentives is defined as the dif-
ferences in the number of remaining conflict issues with the employer 
between union i and union j in each negotiation. For example, union i is not 
able to compromise with the employer on six issues, whereas union j is not 
able to compromise with the employer on four issues. Thus, the difference 
in substantive incentive for calling a strike is two.
Competitor’s size and size difference
Competitor’s size is defined as the number of members union j represents in 
the company or sector who are covered by the particular collective agree-
ment (before any potential extension to other firms in the sector) as a per-
centage of the total employees in the sector or company who are covered by 
the collective agreement. Information on membership rates was obtained 
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via the respondents and cross-checked with the unions’ own official mem-
bership reports. Size difference between union i and union j is the difference 
between the size of union i and that of union j. For example, if union i rep-
resents 40% of the employees and union j 50%, the size difference between 
these unions is 10.
Overlap in membership
Overlap in membership is the number of members that may defect from 
union i to union j and vice versa. The overlap between two unions is not 
necessarily symmetric: When union i has a wider scope of membership than 
union j, union i may have a larger overlap with union j than vice versa. 
Although the theory does not make a distinction between the members a 
union can lose and the members a union can win from its competitor, I made 
such a distinction in the measurement of overlap for the purpose of validity. 
For a valid measure of overlap, the questionnaire distinguishes between 
“defensive” and “offensive” overlap. Defensive overlap refers to the percent-
age of members union i has the potential to lose, whereas offensive overlap 
refers to the percentage of members union i can gain from another union j, 
according to the union representatives responding to question 2 in Box 1 in 
Appendix 2. This question was repeated for every pair of unions in the col-
lective bargaining process. The variable of overlap used in the analysis is the 
combination of defensive and offensive overlap, obtained by computing the 
defensive overlap and the offensive overlap and dividing it by the total 
employees covered by the collective agreement.
Note that with this measurement of overlap, I assume that (a) the overlap 
in membership between union i and union j weighs equally for both unions 
and (b) losing a certain number of members weighs equally with winning 
the same number of members.
Interaction overlap and size of the competitor
The interaction is the product term of the overlap between union i and union 
j with the size of union j computed after centering both predictors around 
the group mean, that is, the collective bargaining mean.
Description of the data
Table 2 shows several descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
analyses.
Table 3 reports some univariate analyses that provide a description of the 
three values on the dependent variable. The table shows that the mean 
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combined size of union i and union j is significantly higher for the joint 
strike strategy compared with that mean of the unions who choose a solitary 
strategy or a joint peaceful strategy. This most likely reflects the importance 
of the number of workers (the “quota”) that must be mobilized for the strike. 
However, the mean size of the unions applying a solitary strategy, which is 
smaller than that of union pairs in a peaceful strategy, does not withhold 
some unions from striking on their own. Another important observation is 
that the differences in size are significantly larger for unions applying a joint 
action, whereas their substantive differences are significantly smaller, sug-
gesting that cooperation in joint industrial action is more likely for unions 
that differ considerably in size while having similar levels of substantive 
conflict with the employer. Finally, the mean overlap with the competitor is 
considerably lower for unions that choose a solitary strategy than for unions 
that choose a joint strategy with union j, suggesting that overlap is associ-
ated with cooperation, both in joint action strategies and joint peaceful strat-
egies. In the following section, I report on the multivariate test of the 
hypotheses, controlling for the embeddedness of unions within collective 
agreement negotiations.
Results
Joining forces enables unions to organize industrial action more successfully 
than they would on their own. These alliances are not necessarily consensual 
because unions can force competitors into a joint strategy. Table 4 presents the 
results of the multinomial logistic regression on the probabilities that union i 
applies the same strategy as its competitor union j. The table presents the 
results of the multinomial logistic regression in which joint strikes are distin-
guished from joint peaceful strategies. The reference category is a solitary 
strategy, that is, a deviation by union i from its competitor’s—union j’s—
strategy. The robust standard errors are clustered on the collective agreement 
negotiation to control for the nested structure of the data: each union pair is 
nested in a collective agreement negotiation.
The results of the multinomial logistic regression presents the effects of 
the independent variables on (a) the probability that union i calls for indus-
trial action when union j does and (b) the probability that union i will abstain 
from industrial action when union j abstains from industrial action.
The multinomial logistic regression produces an insignificant main 
effect of overlap, indicating that overlap with union j does not increase the 
likelihood of union i engaging in a joint industrial action with union j. This 
finding rejects Hypothesis 1. A significant positive effect is found for the 
differences in size between unions i and j (B = 3.83; p < 0.1). This indicates 
that unions are more likely to form strike coalitions when they differ in size, 
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which increases mobilization interdependence, which in turn supports 
Hypothesis 2.
The interaction between the overlap with and the size of union j has a 
significant effect on the probability of joint action (B = .55; p < 0.001), 
meaning that when a union competes with a larger union, it is more likely to 
engage in a joint action strategy with this larger competitor rather than devi-
ate from its competitor. This indicates that the effect of overlap increases 
with the size of a union’s competitor, as predicted by Hypothesis 3.
The effects found for competition and mobilization interdependency on 
joint strategies hold even when controlled for the alternative explanation for 
cooperation: similarities in substantive conflict with the employer. For ease 
of interpretation, I use the inverse of similarities, that is, the difference in 
substantive conflict. The regression produces a significant negative effect 
for the size of the substantive differences between union i and union j 
(B = −6.48; p < 0.1), meaning that the likelihood of cooperation in a joint 
action increases when the substantive motives for a strike for both unions 
converge, which supports Hypothesis 4.
For predicting the probabilities of a joint peace as opposed to a soli-
tary action of one of the unions in a union pair, none of the predictors are 
significant, including similarities in substantive conflict with the 
employer.
Conclusion
International comparative research suggests that unions compete for mem-
bers, and that industrial action is an important tool of propaganda. Union 
Table 3. Pair-wise t-test of differences in means by strategy.
What strategy Solitary 
strategy
Same strategy N (unions)
Joint strike Joint peace  
N number of 
pairs of unions
57 70 87 214
Combined size 
union pair
0.18 <0.31> 0.21 214
Substantive 
differences
0.11 >0.04< 0.07 214
Size differences 0.11 <0.18> 0.12 214
Overlap 2.41<< 5.74 4.14 214
In bold:  mean values  significantly (p values <0.05 or lower)  differing from those in the 
other groups.
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rivalry is held responsible for high strike activity. Empirically, the hypoth-
esis of competing unions is still difficult to prove. Although this seems to be 
confirmed for several countries, important exceptions remain. British 
research into the effects of multi-unionism on bargaining outcomes and 
labor disputes suggests that it is not the presence of multi-unionism per se 
that is responsible for negative bargaining effects. Instead, researchers argue 
that the degree to which their membership overlaps determines the bargain-
ing power of unions. Due to their weakened bargaining position, unions can 
join forces when their memberships overlap and will engage in single-table 
bargaining. As a result, researchers suggest, in multi-union single-table bar-
gaining, unions act as one unified actor and therefore such bargaining equals 
single-union bargaining in its outcomes. Such a conclusion entirely obscures 
all notions of competition between unions for members.
I argue that this perhaps may hold for unions that are not competing for 
members, but that multi-union bargaining does indeed differ from single-
union bargaining in two respects. First, multi-unions create mobilization 
dependence between unions, by which I mean that union depend on each 
other’s membership to mobilize enough workers for a successful strike. 
Second, the representation of the same group of workers sometimes may 
provoke workers to substitute one union for the other. I argued that indus-
trial conflict is an occasion in which workers may do so. This introduces the 
membership competition referred to by comparative research. I argue that 
union competition may lead to forced cooperation because smaller unions 
in particular may lose their autonomy to decide whether to engage in strikes 
or not. Elaborating on these conditions, I formulated four hypotheses on the 
effects of membership overlap, membership size differences and substan-
tive differences on the probability of joint industrial action, and the proba-
bility of joint conciliatory strategies.
The empirical test of these hypotheses produced three important find-
ings. First, controlling for similarities in substantive incentives, competi-
tion between unions does lower the autonomy of smaller unions and 
increases the probability that a small union will be forced into joining a 
strike when the size of its competitor increases. Second, when unions dif-
fer in size, the likelihood of a joint action, compared with a solitary strat-
egy, becomes larger. This indicates the presence of mobilization 
dependence, which, as I argued in this article’s section, leads smaller 
unions to abstain from solitary action strategies. Third, overlap as such 
increases the probability of neither joint action nor joint peaceful strategy. 
It is the combination of membership competition and mobilization depend-
ency that leads to forced cooperation.
These results show that joint action is not always an indication of volun-
tary cooperation or union solidarity. On the contrary, union alliances in 
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action may be the result of the decisions of a single, more powerful union. 
For the union that is forced to follow the strategy of its competitor, the con-
sequences for interest representation and autonomy are major. The economic 
effects of multi-union bargaining therefore depend more on the distribution 
of bargaining power than on substantive cooperation between unions, as sug-
gested by previous studies (Bryson, 2005; Machin et al., 1993).
The results of the empirical tests thus also shed light on the question 
of why, in some countries and industrial sectors, a negative relationship 
exists between the number of trade unions and strike incidence. This 
study has shown that two conditions are relevant for this question: (a) the 
competition between unions and (b) mobilization dependency. In indus-
trial sectors in which unions differ in size considerably and compete with 
one another, smaller unions lose the autonomy not to strike. Although 
satisfied with the outcome of bargaining, smaller trade unions will call 
industrial action because without an alliance with the largest trade union, 
they are bound to lose members to the largest trade union. The conclusion 
must be that under such circumstances, union competition does not nec-
essarily affect the incidence of industrial action, but the size of strikes in 
terms of unions and union members participating in them, thereby 
increasing the economic costs for the employer and the members of 
smaller unions.
This study has important implications for the present weakened posi-
tion of unions. In addition to attempts to gain presently unorganized 
workers, the findings of this study support unions’ strategies to cooper-
ate, for instance, by mergers. Smaller unions under multi-union bargain-
ing that face a loss of autonomy with respect to their decision to call 
industrial action, can play a key role in reducing the effect of reduced 
overall membership. Obviously, such a merger would be contra-produc-
tive if the merger itself would result in membership loss, for instance, 
because its distinct membership does not feel represented by merger can-
didate. Otherwise, formalizing (forced) cooperation by merging with 
larger unions, for example, can prevent or at least postpone further weak-
ening of union bargaining power (Chaison, 1996; Clark, 2013; Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman, 2013).
Obviously, this study is not without its limitations. It studied a wide 
range of means of industrial conflict, such as strike threats and demonstra-
tions. Although I deem it important that research into industrial conflict 
includes a broader scope of means of protest than strikes only, and that there 
is no theoretical reason to expect that unions’ choices differ for distinct 
means of protest, a larger data set containing more actual strikes would 
allow for an analysis of different types of industrial conflict.
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Notes
1. How plausible is the claim that union leadership would prioritize membership 
above direct membership interest? Leading authors in industrial relations agree 
that unions do. According to Kochan (1980),
Unions leaders must be concerned for the long-run institutional survival 
and power of the union as an organization. This may cause leadership to 
depart from a simple aggregation of membership preferences and to put 
more emphasis on union security than individual members would prefer. 
(p. 172)
The leadership is at least able to misuse its inside knowledge about the negotia-
tions. Ross and Irwin (1951) and Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) were con-
vinced that union leadership makes use of this leverage:
Regardless of strike votes and other formal procedures, the decision to strike 
is one for the leaders of the union to make. It is they who determine on 
behalf of the rank and file whether the employer’s terms are acceptable, 
and it is they who decide whether to put in effect the familiar techniques of 
psychological mobilization. (Kochan, 1980: 337)
2. This varied between strikes, work stoppages, demonstrations, work-to-rule, and 
so on. At first glance, this allows for a more informative ordinal dependent vari-
able in which a strike, in financial terms, is more costly and thus more severe 
than a picket line or a demonstration. The use of such a scale would imply the 
assumption of a (positive) correlation between competition and the severity 
of the means of industrial protest. It would suggest that the choice of protest 
by the trade union will depend on the degree of substantive conflict or on the 
level of its competition with other unions. Such an assumption would refer to 
punishment and revenge rather than to an efficient instrument for persuading 
the employer to give in or to compromise. Why call a costly strike when a mere 
demonstration may be sufficient to force the employer to yield, and the work-
ers to join a union? Instead, I assume that a trade union will be economical in 
its use of industrial conflict and will not invest more in a protest than it deems 
necessary. This calculation depends, among others things, on the vulnerability 
of the employer to the different means of industrial conflict and varies between 
sectors and even employers. Applying an ordinal scale of industrial conflict 
for the purpose of this study would lead to an invalid comparison of means of 
protest between collective bargaining processes. In this regard, a dichotomized 
variable that indicates involvement in industrial conflict is more valid.
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Appendix 1
Substantive incentive for industrial action
This variable was obtained through a computer simulation of the negotiation 
process by the Expected Utility Model of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1985; 
Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994) which is used to model a variety of 
collective decision-making situations. Computer simulations with this model 
predict the outcomes of negotiations. I used these simulations as simplified 
reconstructions of the bargaining processes in which employers and trade 
unions negotiate over a set of bargaining issues. Each bargaining process 
simulation is based on five steps through which a collective decision is 
reached. In the Expected Utility Model, each party holds a preferred position 
on each bargaining issue. The main assumption is that an actor attempts to 
influence the positions of the other actors in such a way that the bargaining 
outcome more closely resembles its own preferred position. In the first step, 
the actors choose their preferred positions and the salience they attach to the 
bargaining issues. This determines their utility functions. The actors then 
obtain information about the preferred position and issue salience, in other 
words, the utility function of the other participants in the negotiation, to esti-
mate the expected outcome for each bargaining issue. The Expected Utility 
Model assumes that actors calculate this expected outcome by the weighted 
median voter position of all actors on each issue. The actors then calculate 
the utility losses caused by these expected outcomes. The next two steps 
involve the actual bargaining. Actors attempt to influence one of the bargain-
ing partners by persuading it to accept a change of voting position to obtain 
a collective outcome closer to its own preferred position. This persuasion is 
based on implicit threats to use power (e.g. by launching attacks, strikes, or 
industrial conflict) and involves differences in the bargaining power of the 
actors. In the fourth step, actors evaluate all of the proposals that they have 
received and accept the proposal that they expect will have the most positive 
(or least negative) effects on the collective outcome, and change their voting 
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positions according to these proposals. These steps in the negotiation process 
are repeated until no further change of position is possible given the respec-
tive positions, power, and issue saliences (=the importance of each issue 
relative to the other issues) of the parties. Then, the model predicts the col-
lective outcome by calculating the final weighted median voter position 
(Achterkamp and Akkerman, 2003). For the simulation of the collective bar-
gaining processes, I excluded this final step because a collective agreement 
is not made through a decision rule but is an individual decision by the unions 
and the employer about whether to accept the offer resulting from the bar-
gaining process. For the construction of the substantive incentives of the 
unions, I used the final bargaining positions of each of the employers and 
compared them with those of each trade union. Because all issues were 
scaled on a one-dimensional scale and normalized, the positions on the issues 
ranged from 0 to 1. This means that the distances between the positions also 
lie between 0 and 1. A difference of 0 between the employer and union i on 
issue x means that the employer and union i agreed on issue x. I categorized 
an issue as a “conflict issue” if the distance on that issue was >0.1 on the 
normalized scale. For each union in a collective bargaining, I added together 
all of its conflict issues and divided this by its total number of bargaining 
issues to obtain the proportion of issues on which the union has not reached 
an agreement with the employer. In this way, the variable “substantive 
incentive” was constructed, which is, in fact, the proportion of issues for 
which the union has not reached an agreement with the employer. For a 
more technical explanation and testing of the instrument for establishing 
substantive incentives for industrial conflict, please refer to Achterkamp 
and Akkerman (2003).
Data for the bargaining simulation
The data required for this simulation were collected by means of a detailed 
quantitative reconstruction of every collective bargaining process. The first 
step was to establish the set of bargaining issues of each collective bargain-
ing process. For this, I made use of the standard procedure in the Dutch 
collective bargaining process of distributing letters of demands and proposi-
tions among the bargaining parties. These letters provided a preliminary list 
of bargaining issues, which was checked and amended by the respondents. 
The next step was to construct a one-dimensional scale for each issue. The 
respondents were asked to identify the preferred position of its own organi-
zation and that of the other bargaining parties on all of the issue scales. The 
next step in the reconstruction of the bargaining process was to weight all of 
the issues by their importance or salience. The salience of the issues was 
quantified on a scale of 0 to 100 on which a score of 0 meant that the actor 
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was indifferent about the issue and a score of 100 meant that the issue was 
of extreme importance. Salience is a relative measure, which can only com-
pare the issues between actors and has no absolute meaning. Again, the 
respondents were asked to do this for their own organization and for the 
other bargaining parties. The final step was the measurement of third actor 
characteristics, the bargaining power of each participant. The respondents 
were asked to identify the most powerful actor in the bargaining process, 
which was assigned a score of 100. The power of the other bargaining part-
ners was then related to this most powerful actor. Here, a broad definition of 
power was used; all potential components of power were included in this 
variable. The most reported components were membership numbers (for 
unions), financial means to withstand a strike (for the employer), and the 
potential to obtain media attention.
Appendix 2
Box 1. Data gathering union substitutability.
Question on union substitutability
Some unions have a distinct membership, which strongly differs from that of that of 
other unions. For reasons of ideology, job level, and occupation, the members would 
never join another union. It is also possible that the membership of two (or more) 
unions have much in common. I would like to know how large the similarities are 
between the unions in this collective bargaining process. I will compare the unions 
in pairs. First I will ask you to identify the sorts of differences between the unions’ 
members. You will then be asked to assess how many of union A’s members may 
defect to union B quite easily, and vice versa. I would like you to express this in 
a number between 0 and 100. A score of 100 means that there are no differences 
between the unions and that all members of union A could easily join union B. A 
score of 0 means that none of union A’s members would defect to union B.
The comparison between union A and union B.
a.  What are the main differences between the members of union A and union B?†
b. How many members of union A could join union B?
None                      All
0------------------------------------/------------------------------------100%
c. How many members of union B could join union A?
None                      All
0------------------------------------/------------------------------------100%
†: The representatives were explicitly asked to answer all of questions regarding the 
situation before the first bargaining round.
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